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“ORANGE BOOK” LISTING OF PATENTS UNDER THE HATCH-
WAXMAN ACT 
JACOB S. WHARTON* 
[L]aw is order, good law is good order.1 
A corollary to Aristotle’s statement is that bad law is bad order, or, in other 
words, disorder.  When Congress enacts new laws, that body indubitably hopes 
that such laws will further the goals we, as a society, find desirable and also 
further the added purpose of avoiding disorder.  Occasionally, a statutory 
scheme is established that leads to an inequitable or undesirable result.  Society 
commonly associates these results as “loop holes” in the laws, or shortcomings 
that lead to inadvertent and inequitable situations.  Society’s observations, as is 
often the case, are right. 
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act (“the 
Hatch-Waxman Act” or “the Act”).2  The amendments altered the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act3 (“FFDCA” or “FDCA”) and the patent laws4 
by creating a statutory scheme that sought to strike a balance between “two 
conflicting policy objectives: to induce brand name pharmaceutical firms to 
make the investments necessary to research and develop new drug products, 
while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of 
those drugs to market.”5  These amendments have, in part, led to both public 
benefit and detriment.  This article investigates certain litigation involving the 
Act, evaluates the current statutory and regulatory constructs, including the 
 
* Mr. Wharton is an associate with the law firm of Harness, Dickey & Pierce, P.L.C.  His practice 
focuses on intellectual property litigation.  Please direct comments or questions to 
jwharton@hdp.com. 
 1. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 162 (Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge University Press 
1988). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360cc (2000), and 35 
U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)). 
 3. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–397 (2000). 
 4. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–376 (2000). 
 5. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting on 
other grounds).  A generic drug contains the same active ingredients as its brand-name 
counterpart, but does not necessarily contain the same inactive ingredients.  Mova Pharm. Corp. 
v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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government’s own opinions, and, in particular, traces the entangled history of 
one drug, Neurontin®, through both the courts and the media. 
I.  STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
The modern profusion of . . . governmental authorities offers almost limitless 
possibilities for abuse.6 
The 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act introduced a complex set of rules with the 
stated purpose to “make available more low cost generic drugs.”7  The 
amendments brought about by the Act “were designed to simplify and expedite 
the process by which the generic drugs are brought to market.”8  In passing the 
Act, Congress was motivated by the concern that the Food and Drug 
Administration’s (“the FDA”) lengthy drug approval process was a burden for 
both the generic manufacturers and the rights and investments of the branded 
drug manufacturers.9  This section provides the general framework necessary 
to fully appreciate the impact of certain judicial decisions discussed herein.  
This is, unfortunately, a complicated statute; it is described by one court as 
“cumbersome”10 and by another as “very confusing and ambiguous.”11  
Despite this, or rather because of this, it is worthwhile to investigate the statute 
and review whether the above-stated goals are being realized, and to what 
degree.  It is also valuable so that the branded drug manufacturer and generic 
drug manufacturer can clearly discern their rights and avoid needless litigation. 
Before the enactment of the Act, both branded12 and generic13 drug 
manufacturers wishing to bring a drug to market were required to file a New 
 
 6. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 347 (1978). 
 7. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647. 
 8. Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 9. The Amendments have been criticized for, inter alia, taking a “split-the-baby” approach 
in an attempt to reach its stated goals.  See Watson Pharms., Inc. v. Henney, 194 F. Supp. 2d 442, 
444 (D. Md. 2001). 
 10. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 955 F. Supp. 128, 130 (D.D.C. 1997). 
 11. Mova, 140 F.3d at 1069 (quoting Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Sullivan, No. 89-6-C(K), slip 
op. at 7 (N.D.W.Va. May 5, 1989)). 
 12. The term “branded” drug manufacturer refers to those drug manufacturers holding the 
patent rights to a particular FDA approved drug.  The terms “pioneer” and “brand name” 
manufacturer are used by the courts and various government agencies quoted herein.  For 
purposes of this writing, the terms are used interchangeably unless otherwise indicated. 
 13. The term “generic” drug manufacturer refers to those drug manufacturers producing 
drugs having the same active ingredient or ingredients, often in the same formulation, as those 
found in the products of “branded” drug manufacturers.  Generic drugs are often sold at prices 
considerably lower than branded drugs.  See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, How Increased 
Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry (July 1998) (hereinafter “CBO Study”), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ 
showdoc.cfm?index=655&sequence=1 (last visited Feb. 22, 2003). 
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Drug Application, or “NDA.”14  This requirement presented a considerable 
barrier to generic drug manufacturers because an NDA requires a full battery 
of safety and efficacy tests, including expensive clinical trials.15  To further 
impede a generic manufacturer’s entry into the market, and before the Act, the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals16 interpreted the patent laws in a manner such 
that a generic manufacturer was liable for infringement for research and 
clinical trials until patents claiming the branded drugs had expired.17  This 
interpretation of the statute resulted in the branded drug manufacturer having a 
de facto extension of its patent monopoly because a generic manufacturer 
would not only have to begin research and production after the patent’s 
technical expiration, but would have to complete the NDA process as well. 
In order to benefit consumers, the Act altered this requirement by allowing 
a generic drug manufacturer to “piggyback on the original NDA filed by the 
manufacturer of the brand-name drug.”18  This streamlined process allows a 
drug manufacturer, generic or branded, to submit an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (“ANDA”).19  The ANDA process allows a drug manufacturer to 
rely on the clinical studies performed by the New Drug Applicant and to 
forego the safety and effectiveness testing of its new generic drug.  The ANDA 
applicant must prove only that its drug is a “bioequivalent” to the pioneer drug 
approved in the NDA.20  This process allows generic manufacturers “to avoid 
 
 14. The term “NDA,” as used herein, may refer to a “New Drug Application” or a “New 
Drug Applicant.”  Its use will be apparent from the context. 
 15. See Mova, 140 F.3d at 1063. 
 16. The Federal Court of Appeals was created in 1982 by act of Congress.  See Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.  Congress conferred exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction over most cases involving patent issues, including: (1) decisions by the 
Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office; (2) decisions by District Courts in 
infringement and other patent suits; (3) decisions by the United States Court of Federal Claims 
(including reasonable compensation suits against the United States for use of a patented 
invention); and (4) determinations of the United States International Trade Commission.  See 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(4)(A), 1295(a)(1), 1295(a)(3) and 1295(a)(6) (2000) respectively. 
 17. See, e.g., Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (holding that the plain language of § 271(a) made the manufacture and testing (a use) of a 
patented product before the expiration of the patent an act of infringement unless licensed, even if 
that manufacture or use was solely for the purpose of conducting tests and developing the 
necessary information to apply for regulatory approval later on).  See also Warner-Lambert Co. v. 
Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1356-58 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (recounting history of the Hatch-
Waxman Act).  For further analysis of Section 271 of Title 35, see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, 
Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990) (“No interpretation we have been able to imagine can transform § 
271(e)(1) into an elegant piece of statutory draftsmanship.”). 
 18. Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 19. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000). 
 20. See id. at § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).  See also Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 676 (“The ANDA applicant 
can substitute bioequivalence data for the extensive animal and human studies of safety and 
effectiveness that must accompany a full new drug application.”). 
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the costly and time-consuming process associated with NDAs, thus facilitating 
the approval and dissemination of low-costs generic drugs.”21  The Act 
amended the patent laws so that a generic drug manufacturer no longer 
infringes a patent covering an approved drug by performing those acts 
necessary to prepare and file an ANDA.22  The Congressional Budget Office 
estimates that, by purchasing bioequivalents of brand name drugs, consumers 
saved $8-10 billion on retail purchases of prescription drugs in 1994 alone.23  
Generic drugs now comprise more than 47 percent of the prescriptions filled 
for pharmaceutical products.24  This is up from 19 percent in 1984 when the 
Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted.25 
To compensate pioneer drug manufacturers that invest heavily in the 
clinical trials necessary for the NDA, the Hatch-Waxman Act also amended 
the patent laws “to protect patent holders whose rights could be threatened by 
the marketing of generic versions of their patented innovations.”26  To this end, 
the amendments establish a mechanism for the listing of patents impacted by a 
generic manufacturer attempting to enter the market through the filing of an 
ANDA.  Each drug company filing an NDA must submit, as part of its 
application, a list of all the patents that: 
[C]laim[] the drug for which the applicant submitted the application or which 
claim[] a method of using such drug and with respect to which a claim of 
patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by 
the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.27 
The FDA, through regulation, has defined the three types of patents that may 
be submitted with an NDA: (1) drug substance (active ingredient patents) 
patents; (2) drug product (formulation and composition) patents; and (3) 
method of use patents.28  When the FDA approves an NDA, the patent 
information submitted therewith is published in a publication entitled 
“Approved Drug Products With Therapeutic Equivalence,” known in agency 
parlance as the “Orange Book.”29  An NDA applicant must list any new patents 
 
 21. Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984)). 
 22. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).  See also aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 
231 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 23. CBO Study, supra note 13. 
 24. Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, Federal Trade 
Commission, July 2002, at p. i. (hereinafter “the FTC Study”), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2003). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (citing Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 243 F.3d 
579, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
 27. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000). 
 28. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2002). 
 29. See Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Terry G. 
Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating Hatch-Waxman Issues During the Claims Drafting 
Process, 54 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 245, 249-50 (1999). 
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that issue during the pendency of the NDA application that claims the drug at 
issue.30  Further, an NDA applicant also must amend its patent listing to 
include information about any newly issued patents that claim the drug at issue 
within thirty days of their issuance if they want to later invoke the statutory 
mechanisms for excluding generic manufacturers (the 30-month stay, 
discussed in detail supra).31  To further complicate matters, because an 
applicant may not receive original approval for all aspects of the drug as 
described in the original NDA submission, the applicant must amend the patent 
submission to list only the patents that meet the listing criteria for the approved 
drug product.32  Orange Book listings play an important role in effectuating the 
dual goals articulated by Congress. 
There are four important points to make about Orange Book listings: (1) 
ANDA applicants are required to make certifications with respect to patents 
listed in the Orange Book; (2) the NDA holder can use the listed patents to 
invoke a temporary stay against approval of any ANDAs; (3) the FDA 
mandates that method of use patents can be listed and remain in the book only 
if such patents actually claim a use that has been approved by the agency; and 
(4) the FDA has consistently taken the position that it does not, and will not, 
police the listings for accuracy.  Neither of these positions are statutory 
directives; rather, they are imposed through FDA regulations.33 
These first two points are discussed in more detail below.  With respect to 
the third, the listing of use patents, the FDA’s obvious goal is to restrict those 
patents listed to patents that actually claim an approved use of the drug.  For 
example, if the drug was aspirin,34 and its approved use was to treat headaches, 
a patent claiming the use of aspirin to treat high blood pressure should not be 
listed.  If, at some later time, aspirin is approved for the treatment of high 
blood pressure, then the patent may be listed.  The FDA takes the position that 
it is the NDA’s obligation to verify the propriety of the use patents in the 
Orange Book.35 
 
 30. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000). 
 31. Id. at § 355(b)(2)(B). 
 32. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c)(2)(ii) (2002). 
 33. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b); Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 28,872, 28,908 (July 10, 1989) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 10, 310, 314, & 320 
(“[I]nformation will be published in the list only on patents that . . . claim approved indications or 
other conditions of use.”); Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent & Exclusivity 
Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338, 50,345 (Oct. 3, 1994) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314). 
 34. Aspirin is good example of a trademark “gone generic.”  Aspirin, at one time, was the 
trade name for salicylic acid, the active ingredient in what we now call aspirin. 
 35. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent & Exclusivity Provisions, 
59 Fed. Reg., supra note 33, at 50,345. 
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That brings the fourth point squarely into focus—the FDA does not assume 
any responsibility for verifying the patent submissions of an ANDA.36  The 
agency views its role as purely ministerial.37  The agency bases this position on 
the premise that they do not have the resources or the expertise to determine 
the validity or scope of patent claims.38  The FDA’s practice is simply to list 
the patent information it receives from brand manufacturers with the 
expectation that those parties will understand and abide by the statutory and 
regulatory mandates.39 
In formulating the applicable regulations, the FDA explicitly declined to 
establish a “mechanism for review of submitted patent information to 
determine, at least on a very general basis, applicability to the particular NDA 
in question.”40  The duty to verify the correctness of Orange Book listings, at 
least under the current law, soundly resides with NDA holders.41  The statute 
does not mandate the FDA to take any other position.  It is, however, the 
FDA’s position that allows manufacturers to “game” the system, which is 
discussed further in Section II. 
The ANDA applicant, when seeking approval for a generic drug, must 
specify information about the patents listed by the branded drug manufacturer 
in the Orange Book.  The information must include: 
[T]he patent number and the expiration date of any patent which claims the 
drug for which the applicant submitted the application or which claims a 
method of using such drug and with respect to which a claim of patent 
infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the 
owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.42 
There are two means by which an ANDA can satisfy this requirement.43 
In the first instance, when the Orange Book-listed patent “claims the listed 
[i.e., FDA-approved] drug . . . or which claims a use for such listed drug for 
 
 36. aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2002) (“In short, the FDA’s 
position is that if the NDA holder stands on it Orange Book listing, aggrieved parties are out of 
luck.”).  See also, Mahn, supra note 29, at 250 (noting the FDA’s “willingness to list in the 
Orange Book virtually any patent submitted by an NDA holder”). 
 37. Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent & Exclusivity Provisions, 
59 Fed. Reg., supra note 33, at 50,345. 
 40. Id. at 50,343; see aaiPharma, 296 F.3d at 243 (upholding the FDA’s “purely ministerial 
approach to the Orange Book listing process” as a reasonable interpretation of its statutory 
responsibilities). 
 41. See Watson Pharm., Inc. v. Henney, 194 F. Supp. 2d 442, 445-46 (D. Md. 2001) (“In 
making its decision to list a patent . . . it is entirely appropriate and reasonable for the FDA to rely 
on the patentee’s declaration as to coverage, and to let the patent infringement issues play out in 
other, proper arenas, as is the clear intent of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.”). 
 42. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000). 
 43. Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 194. 
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which the applicant is seeking approval,” an ANDA applicant must certify that 
the new drug, i.e., the generic drug, will not infringe the patent and explain that 
conclusion.44  The statute provides four grounds on which this certification can 
be made: (1) that the required patent information has not been filed; (2) that the 
patent has expired; (3) that the patent will expire on a certain date; or (4) that 
the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the drug for which approval is 
sought.45  An ANDA applicant must also make additional certifications with 
respect to any newly listed patents during its application process, so long as the 
NDA holder submits the patent for listing no later than thirty days after the 
patent’s issuance.46  The certification date determines the date on which FDA 
approval of the application can become effective.47  The ANDA must submit 
information for all patents listed in the Orange Book “despite any disagreement 
as to the correctness of the patent information.”48 
An ANDA making a paragraph (I) or paragraph (II) certification may be 
approved immediately if the FDA finds that all the relevant scientific and 
regulatory requirements have been met.49  An application making a paragraph 
(III) certification becomes effective on the date the patent or patents at issue 
expire, assuming the other FDA requirements are met.50  Certifications made 
under paragraphs (I-III), therefore, do not implicate patent infringement 
because the generic manufacturer’s product will not come to market until any 
relevant patents have expired.  It is this last option, the so-called “Paragraph 
(IV) certification,” however, that gives rise to most litigation involving 
ANDAs. 
The Paragraph (IV) certification is frequently litigated because of the 
rights created in both an ANDA and the NDA when such certification is made.  
An ANDA applicant making a paragraph (IV) certification must give notice of 
the filing both to the owner of the patent and to the holder of the NDA for the 
approved drug (often, but not always, the same party).51  The applicant must 
also include a detailed statement providing the factual and legal basis of the 
applicant’s opinion that the patent is not valid or will not be infringed.52  The 
Hatch-Waxman Act provides that the act of filing a paragraph (IV) 
certification with respect to a patent creates a cause of action for patent 
 
 44. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
 45. Id. at (I)-(IV). 
 46. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(vi) (2002). 
 47. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B) (2000). 
 48. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f). 
 49. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i). 
 50. Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii). 
 51. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i). 
 52. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii) (2000). 
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infringement in the patent holder.53  The patent holder, once it receives notice 
of the paragraph (IV) certification, has forty-five days in which to file a suit for 
patent infringement.  The patent holder is motivated to bring suit because the 
FDA will approve, unless such suit is brought, the ANDA’s application.54  If 
an infringement suit is initiated, the FDA’s approval of the ANDA is 
automatically stayed for 30 months (“the 30-month stay”).55  Precisely 
speaking, the stay continues until the earliest of: (1) the expiration of the 
patent; (2) judicial resolution of the patent infringement suit, or (3) thirty 
months from the patent holder’s receipt of notice.56  In addition, the period of 
the stay can be lengthened or shortened by the court hearing the infringement 
action if either party fails to “reasonably cooperate in expediting the action.”57  
These provisions allow the patent holder to defend their intellectual property 
rights before the FDA approves a generic version of a drug.58  Thus, the listing 
of a patent in the Orange Book is important for the fact that the patent holder 
can potentially rely on the 30-month stay.  In the alternative, “[i]f a patent is 
not listed in the Orange Book, ANDA applicants do not have to file a 
paragraph (IV) certification, and the patent holder is unable to take advantage 
of the thirty-month stay.”59  Thus, a patent holder would have to wait until a 
generic sought out and received ANDA approval and began marketing its drug 
product before bringing suit.  The implications of the 30-month stay are of 
great economic import to a drug company and, as discussed below, the listing 
of patents in the Orange Book has become the issue in more than one lawsuit. 
Facing a patent infringement suit and a 30-month stay on its ANDA, a 
generic manufacturer may not wish to risk liability in an infringement suit.  
The Hatch-Waxman Act, however, provides an incentive to generic 
manufacturers willing to risk defending a patent infringement suit.  The first 
generic manufacturer to gain approval of an ANDA containing a paragraph 
(IV) certification is entitled to a 180-day period of market exclusivity.60  
During this 180-day period, described by one court as an “edenic moment of 
freedom from the pressures of the marketplace,”61 the FDA will not approve 
applications subsequently filed by other manufacturers.  This effectively 
 
 53. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2000) (“It shall be an act of infringement to submit . . . [an 
ANDA] . . . if the purpose of such submission is to obtain [FDA] approval . . . to engage in the 
commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug . . . claimed in a patent . . . before the expiration of 
such patent.”). 
 54. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 802 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 58. aaiPharma, 296 F.3d at 232 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Royce Labs., Inc., 69 
F.3d 1130, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 59. aaiPharma, 296 F.3d at 232. 
 60. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000). 
 61. Mova v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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allows the generic drug manufacturer to move its drug to market before the 
other generic manufacturers.62  From 1992 until 1998, the FDA did not grant 
the 180-day market exclusivity to any applicants.  Since 1998, however, and as 
a result of a court ruling changing the FDA’s regulations, the FDA has granted 
the 180-day market exclusivity for thirty-one drug products.63 
As mentioned above, there is an alternative to a paragraph (IV) 
certification.  This alternative is commonly known as a “section (viii) 
statement.”64  This section applies when the patent in question is a “method of 
use of patent which does not claim a use for which the applicant is seeking 
approval under this subsection.”65  An applicant is directed, by FDA 
regulation, to use a section (viii) statement when “the labeling for the drug 
product for which the applicant is seeking approval does not include any 
indications that are covered by the use patent” that was submitted by the 
NDA.66  When an applicant files a section (viii) statement, no certification is 
needed under paragraphs I-IV; rather, the ANDA applicant must submit a 
statement that the method of use patent at issue does not claim the use of the 
drug for which the applicant is seeking approval.67  The significant difference 
between a paragraph (IV) certification and a section (viii) statement is that an 
ANDA applicant making a section (viii) statement does not have to notify the 
patent owner of its ANDA nor is the ANDA applicant liable to a patent 
infringement action.68  Furthermore, should the patent holder decide to bring 
an infringement action, the 30-month stay could not be invoked.  The FDA, 
therefore, can immediately approve an ANDA containing a section (viii) 
statement.  This provision obviously provides an attractive route for ANDA 
applicants, even though it does not provide for a 180-day market exclusivity 
period.  As discussed below, the availability of a section (viii) statement turns 
on whether the method of use patent covering the approved drug actually 
claims the use for which the ANDA is applying. 
Within this tapestry of laws and regulations, litigants have brought to light 
many of the shortcomings of this system.  For some, the cause of action lies in 
a patent infringement suit to protect their research and development 
 
 62. See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 63. Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, Federal Trade 
Commission, July 2002, at 57 (hereinafter “FTC Study”), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (citing Mova, 140 F.3d at 1074). 
 64. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) (2000). 
 65. Id. (emphasis added). 
 66. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(b)(12)(iii)(A) (1998). 
 67. Id.  See also Purepac Pharma. Co v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 191, 194-95 (D.C. 
2002); Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2001), rev’d on other 
grounds, 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 68. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000) (making it an act of infringement to file a paragraph 
(IV) certification). 
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investments.  For others, the causes of action are yet to be recognized by the 
courts, for, as discussed below, the Hatch-Waxman Act failed to supply an 
enforcement mechanism and, consequently, failed to include a deterrent for 
over-aggressive use of patents through Orange Book listings.  A number of 
major players in the pharmaceutical drug industry, both branded and generics, 
have been accused of “gaming” the system.69  None other than the Chairman of 
the Federal Trade Commission (“the FTC”) has testified to the United States 
Senate that certain drug companies have used the system to secure greater 
profits for themselves without creating a corresponding benefit to consumers.70 
The FTC followed this testimony by preparing a detailed report (“the FTC 
Study”) that investigated whether the 30-month stay and the 180-day market 
exclusivity provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act “are susceptible to strategies 
to delay or deter consumer access to generic alternatives to brand-name drug 
products.”71  The report notes that an increasing number of generic drug 
manufacturers are seeking to enter the market before the expiration of patents 
held by branded manufacturers.72  The FTC Study reveals that during the 
1980s, only two percent of generic applications sought entry through the 
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act.73  From 1998 to 2000, however, 
approximately 20 percent of the generic applications sought entry before patent 
expiration.74  The FTC Study comprehensively studies the effects the Hatch-
Waxman Act has had on generic drugs reaching the market and is also a 
valuable resource for information regarding antitrust issues.75 
The study reports that, according to the FDA, “from the time Hatch-
Waxman became effective in 1984 through December 31, 2000, 8,019 ANDAs 
were filed with the FDA.”76  Of these applications, 7,536 (94 percent) raised 
no patent issues (i.e., they did not contain a paragraph (IV) certification).77  Six 
percent, or 483, of the total number of ANDA’s did contain paragraph (IV) 
certifications.78  These 483 ANDAs represented 130 unique brand name drug 
products.79  The share of ANDAs containing paragraph (IV) certifications has 
 
 69. Prepared Statement of The Federal Trade Commission, Before the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, Chairman Timothy J. Muris, April 
23, 2002, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/pharmtestimony.htm. 
 70. Id. 
 71. FTC Study, supra note 63, at i-ii. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at ii. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Although antitrust issues are mentioned in this article, those issues warrant separate 
study and, for the most, are not discussed in detail. 
 76. FTC Study, supra note 63, at 10.  FDA staff provided this information to the FTC staff.  
See id. at 10 n.42. 
 77. Id. at 10. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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been increasing since the 1980’s, where in the years 1998-2000 20 percent of 
the ANDAs contained paragraph (IV) certifications.80 
One criticism the FTC Study makes of current practice is that the 30-
month stay provision has unduly delayed entry of generic drugs into the 
market.  The study reports that “[o]n average, the time required for FDA 
review and approval was twenty-five months and fifteen days from the 
application filing date in those cases where generic applicants filing a 
paragraph IV certification were not sued (and thus could begin commercial 
marketing once they had FDA approval).”81  The average time between the 
filing of a patent infringement suit and a district court opinion was twenty-five 
months and thirteen days.82  The average time between the filing of a patent 
infringement suit and a court of appeals decision was thirty-seven months and 
twenty days.83  In practice, even if the 30-month stay has expired, a generic 
manufacturer is not likely to bring their product to market for fear of 
infringement liability if a suit is still pending.  The length of pending litigation, 
however, will likely increase if the NDA holder asserts one or more patents 
against the ANDA applicant.84 
The length of stays has been increasing in recent years.  These additional 
months may be added on to a single 30-month stay when the NDA holder lists 
an additional patent in the Orange Book after an ANDA has filed a 
certification.85  The ANDA is then required to re-certify with respect to this 
later-listed patent.86  This scenario allows for the NDA holder to have more 
than one 30-month stay.  These additional 30-month stays have added between 
4 and 40 months beyond the original 30-month stay.87 
The FTC Study recognizes that the 30-month stay is the tool used by NDA 
holders to prevent generic entry into the market.88  In fact, the study suggest 
that “[t]he 30-month stay provision of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments 
protects brand-name companies beyond their existing intellectual property 
rights.”89  This conclusion is overly broad in that the stay would only extend 
 
 80. FTC Study, supra note 63 at 10. 
 81. Id. at iii. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. The FTC Study reports that as of June 1, 2002, for 6 out of 7 cases that have been 
pending for more than 30 months before a decision from a district court, the brand-name 
company has alleged infringement of three or more patents.  Id.  The FTC study uses the term 
“brand-name company” too broadly in that the NDA holder may or may not be a “brand-name 
company.”  Indeed, many NDA holders are drug manufacturers that make only generic drugs. 
FTC Study, supra note 63, at iii. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 39. 
 89. FTC Study, supra note 63, at 39. 
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existing rights if the patent was to expire during the 30-month stay.  The stay, 
however, can improperly exclude generic manufacturers if a patent is 
improperly listed in the Orange Book.  This improper listing is what has been a 
source of criticism.  The complaint is that these later-listed patents do not meet 
the FDA requirements for listing in the Orange Book, or, in other words, the 
patents do not claim the approved drugs or uses thereof.  This has clearly 
happened, and is discussed in the Neurontin® cases below.  In these cases, a 
use patent was later-issued and later-listed, the stay was continued, but the 
court ultimately determined that the patent did not claim an approved use.  
Thus, by continuing the stay, the NDA improperly extended their exclusivity 
with respect to the approved drug and its approved uses. 
Generic drug manufacturers, however, have been fairly successful in 
infringement suits brought under the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Of all the patent 
infringement actions involving both the first ANDA to file a paragraph (IV) 
certification and the second ANDA to do the same, generic applicants have 
prevailed in seventy-three percent of the cases as of June 1, 2002.90  The FTC 
looked at twenty-five decisions in which the generic manufacturer was 
successful.  In these cases, fourteen were decided on non-infringement and 
eleven were decided on invalidity.91  The rate at which the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit overturned district court opinions involving 
infringement of drug products was eight percent.92  Despite the odds favoring 
generic manufacturers, there still exists the potential for “gaming” the system 
(improper Orange Book listings).  Moreover, avoiding such infringement 
litigation in the first place would be less taxing on all participants, including 
the ultimate consumers of the drugs. 
What emerges from the FTC Study are a number of recommendations to 
ameliorate the insufficiencies of the Hatch-Waxman Act. One recommendation 
is that an NDA should be limited to invoking one 30-month stay per ANDA, 
regardless if additional patents are listed.93  This is an interesting proposal, but 
it penalizes an NDA holder having subsequent patents issue that legitimately 
cover the approved drug or methods of use thereof.  This could potentially 
penalize an NDA for delays in the prosecution of the patent at the Patent and 
Trademark Office.  The FTC Study does recognize that there is no private right 
of action to “de-list” patents, thus, focusing on the real problem—the propriety 
of the Orange Book listings, not the number of 30-month stays.94 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at v. 
 94. FTC Study, supra note 63, at v. 
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The study also suggests that certain classes of patents are not appropriate 
to invoke the 30-month stay.  These include: (1) metabolite patents;95 (2) drug 
intermediate patents;96 (3) polymorph patents;97 and (4) “product by process 
patents that claim a drug product produced by a specified process.”98  This 
suggestion, however, should be taken with caution as it is not the type of patent 
that causes an improper listing in the Orange Book, but rather the improper 
overly broad assertion of its claims.  The root problem rests with the fact there 
is no recognized cause of action against an Orange Book listing; an NDA can 
submit any relevant patent, even if it does not claim the approved drug or 
approved uses thereof. 
A number of cases are discussed below that shed light on the practices that 
have developed under the Hatch-Waxman Act.  In particular, because the use 
of paragraph (IV) certifications has dramatically increased since 1998, the 
majority of these cases are more recent.  A selection of cases found below 
involve one particular drug, Neurontin®.  This, by no means, is the only drug 
that has found itself embroiled in litigation due to the complexities of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.  It is, however, one of the drugs for which there are a 
number of published opinions and one in which the stays have reached an 
exceptionally long time (fifty-three months).99 
II.  JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND LITIGATION INVOLVING THE HATCH-
WAXMAN ACT 
Many cases have involved some aspect of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Since 
its passage in 1984, many courts have opined on its intricacies and nuances, of 
which there are many.  Below is a brief review of opinions that have been 
selected to paint a broad picture of how various parties have found themselves 
in litigation that somehow turns on interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  
In particular, these cases are demonstrative of how aggrieved parties have been 
frustrated by the statutory scheme and judicial interpretation thereof.  The first 
two cases show that the generic manufacturers have battled one another just as 
they have battled brand name manufacturers.  These cases affirm the need to 
clarify the rights of both such parties. 
 
 95. “Patents that claim the chemical compound into which a patient’s body converts the 
approved drug product.”  Id. at 55. 
 96. “Patents that claim a chemical compound used during production of the active 
ingredient, but not appearing in the final drug product.”  Id. 
 97. “Patents that claim a crystalline form of the active ingredient that differs from the 
approved crystalline form.”  Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. It should be noted that the lengthy pendency (time the application spends under 
examination) of the later-listed patent with respect to Neurontin® caused it to be listed after the 
ANDA holders had filed their initial certifications. 
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In Mova Pharmaceutical Corporation v. Shalala,100 the plaintiff, Mova 
Pharmaceutical Corporation (“Mova”), brought an action to compel the FDA 
to withdraw or change the effective date of the approval of an ANDA 
submitted by Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Mylan”) to market a generic 
version of micronized glyburide, a drug used to treat diabetes.101  Mova had 
filed an earlier application to market the same drug.  Thus, they were the 
second ANDA.  Mova’s application, however, was delayed because the NDA 
holder, Pharmacia & Upjohn Company (“Upjohn”), brought a patent 
infringement action against Mova.102 
Mova essentially asked the FDA to delay approval of Mylan’s application 
until Mova prevailed in the infringement suit or it began marketing its drug, 
whichever event came first.103  The FDA countered, citing regulations that 
allowed it “to approve Mylan’s application immediately because, at the time 
Mylan submitted its application Mova had not yet ‘successfully defended’ 
against (that is prevailed in) Upjohn’s patent infringement suit.”104  Mova 
argued the regulation was inconsistent with the section of Title 21 which 
governs the 180-day exclusivity period.105 
The district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the FDA to 
delay approval of Mylan’s ANDA.106  The FDA and Mylan appealed.107  
Upjohn moved to intervene after the district court granted the injunction, but 
their motion was denied.  Upjohn appealed that decision.108  Importantly, for 
reasons that are unclear (and were unclear to the appellate court as well),109 
Upjohn did not bring suit against Mylan in the 45-day window after they filed 
their paragraph (IV) certification, thus precluding them from enacting the 30-
month stay (really a suspension of FDA approval of Mylan’s ANDA), even if 
suit was subsequently brought.110 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the FDA has 
overstepped its authority in enacting and applying the regulation at issue.111 
After an exhaustive analysis of congressional intent, the Court held that the 
 
 100. 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 101. Id. at 1062. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1063 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1)). 
 105. Mova, 140 F.3d at 1063; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000). 
 106. Mova, 140 F.3d at 1063. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1063.  Upjohn moved to intervene to argue against approval of Mylan’s application 
in order to protect its exclusivity in the market.  Id. 
 109. See id. at 1065. 
 110. See 21 U.S.C. 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  Upjohn did eventually sue Mylan.  The court ultimately 
ruled that Upjohn’s patent was invalid and not infringed.  See Mova, 140 F.3d at 1065 n.5. 
 111. Id. at 1076. 
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FDA’s enforcement of its regulation exceeded its statutory authority.112  The 
intervenor, Upjohn, was consequently found to have a right to intervene 
because, “a firm has constitutional standing to challenge a competitor’s entry 
into its market.”113  This case demonstrates that an aggrieved ANDA, seeking 
to protect its position, cannot seek redress from the FDA. 
In a similar case, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Shalala,114 Mylan 
brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the FDA’s 
regulation governing when the 180-day period of market exclusivity begins.115  
In this case, it was Mylan that succeeded in defending a patent infringement 
action before its competitor but was second to have filed an ANDA containing 
a paragraph (IV) certification.  At the time Mylan prevailed in the infringement 
litigation, its competitor was still defending a separate patent infringement 
action.116  Mylan argued it was entitled to begin marketing and was entitled to 
a 180-day market exclusivity period as well. 
Interestingly, Mylan took a diametrically opposed position in this litigation 
as compared to its position in the Mova case.  This is because Mylan found 
itself in the position of having filed the second ANDA with a paragraph (IV) 
certification, unlike in the Mova case, where it sought to deny entry of the 
second filed ANDA holder in to the market.  As in Mova, the District Court for 
the District of Columbia held that the FDA once again exceeded its statutory 
authority in interpreting its regulations.117  Again, this shows the FDA 
regulations need clarification and unambiguous statutory direction. 
In one of the first cases to directly challenge the propriety of an Orange 
Book listing of a patent, the FDA was allowed to reasonably rely on the 
submissions of the NDA holder when determining which patents are properly 
listed.  In Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Henney,118 the NDA holder, Bristol-
Meyers Squibb (“BMS”) claimed that the listed patent at issue claimed “a 
method of using BuSpar® [the trade name of the drug at issue] for all of its 
approved uses.”119  A generic drug manufacturer, Danbury Pharmacal, Inc. 
(“Danbury”), challenged this listing because, according to Danbury, the patent 
at issue only claimed a metabolite of BuSpar® and not the drug itself.120  The 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1074 (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 
(1970)). 
 114. 81 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 115. Mylan sought review of the FDA’s interpretation of 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(e).  Mylan, 81 
F. Supp. 2d at 30.  This issue centered on interpretation of the phrases “a court” and “the court” 
and its bearing on when a generic applicant’s 180-day exclusivity period begins to run.  Id. at 38-
39. 
 116. Id. at 35. 
 117. Id. at 42. 
 118. 194 F. Supp. 2d 442 (D. Md. 2001). 
 119. Id. at 444. 
 120. Id. 
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FDA sought clarification from BMS.  BMS responded that the patent covered 
both a method of using the metabolite and the basic drug itself.121  So, at least 
here, there is a basic claim interpretation issue as opposed to the statutory and 
regulatory interpretation issues in the two previously discussed cases. 
The court held that the FDA was justified in relying upon the assertions of 
BMS in maintaining the listing of the patent, thus avoiding the claim 
interpretation issue altogether.122  The court sanctioned the FDA’s “very 
limited, ministerial role” in listing patents in the Orange Book, finding that 
“patent infringement issues [should] play out in other, proper arenas.”123  This 
limited role has been subsequently upheld by higher courts. 
In Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,124 another generic 
manufacturer seeking to de-list the same patent at issue in Watson and 
manufacture a generic version of BuSpar®, filed suit in the District of 
Columbia.  The district court granted relief, holding that Mylan was entitled to 
declaratory relief because  the patent at issue was improperly listed in the 
Orange Book under the patent laws.125  The Declaratory Judgment Act was 
also approved as a defense to the infringement suit BMS could have brought 
against Mylan under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).126  The Federal Circuit, reversing 
the decision  below, held that a private cause of action to de-list patents found 
in the Orange Book is not recognized under the Patent laws (Title 35) or the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (Title 21).127 
The Federal Circuit based its opinion on the lack of an explicit provision in 
the Hatch-Waxman Act either enabling or prohibiting a private cause of action 
to challenge a patentee’s listing of a patent in the Orange Book.128  The court 
found such an action to be “an impermissible attempt by a private party to 
enforce the FFDCA”129 and further, that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 445. 
 123. Watson, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 445. 
 124. 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 125. Id. at 1325. 
 126. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12-13.  In this case, the facts are 
especially drastic.  On the day BMS’s one patent was set to expire, a day on which Mylan had 
manufactured and was prepared to ship its product, BMS listed the patent at issue, thereby 
triggering the duty of Mylan to make further certifications with respect to the newly listed patent.  
Mylan, 268 F.3d at 1327.  This prompted Mylan to seek injunctive relief regarding this second 
patent.  See id. 
 127. Id. at 1332-33. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1330 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) and stating “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) 
of this section [regarding suits by states in their own names], all such proceedings for the 
enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United 
States.”). 
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provide grounds to bring such suit either.130  This case clearly closes the door 
on private causes of action to correct improper Orange Book listings. 
BMS, although insulated from de-listing its patents, has been subject to 
antitrust lawsuits for its patent listing practice.131  The plaintiffs in the antitrust 
action comprised, among others, generic drug manufacturers.  Resolving 
improper listings by an antitrust cause of action is obviously costly for both the 
plaintiffs and certainly maintains the high cost of the drug at issue until the suit 
is resolved.  Such antitrust cases clearly indicate the need for a private cause of 
action regarding Orange Book listings. 
One other possible route that an aggrieved party could take, by utilizing the 
Administrative Procedure Act, has also been foreclosed.  In aaiPharma Inc. v. 
Thompson, the Fourth Circuit held that the FDA does not violate that 
Administrative Procedure Act by taking a “purely ministerial” role in Orange 
Book listings.132  In an interesting twist, the plaintiff, aaiPharma, sought to 
have its patent listed in the Orange Book along with the NDA holder’s 
patents.133  After approaching the NDA holder with such a request, and being 
rebuffed, aaiPharma approached the FDA, which also refused to list the 
patent.134 aaiPharma wanted such patent listed to prevent other generic 
manufacturers from entering the market. 
The cases discussed above demonstrate that there are many aggrieved 
parties with respect to Orange Book listings.  The cases also reveal that these 
parties have been met with resistance in attempting to correct what they feel is 
an inequitable wrong.  The courts, on the one hand, seem to have sided with 
the branded drug manufacturers, but on the other hand, they have articulated 
that that they are bound by the clear language Congress used in the Hatch-
Waxman Act.  Patentees should always be able to extract the entirety of their 
legal monopoly from a patent.  They should not, however, have unchecked 
abilities that allow for inequitable extension of the rights conferred under the 
patent laws.  The story of one drug, gabapentin hydrochloride, set forth below, 
is particularly helpful in exposing some of the shortcomings of the Hatch-
Waxman Act. 
 
 130. Mylan, 268 F.3d at 1330.  See also Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that a generic drug manufacturer cannot bring a declaratory judgment 
action or an injunctive action against a NDA holder under the Hatch-Waxman provisions of the 
FDCA or the patent laws requiring it to de-list a patent from the Orange Book). 
 131. See In re Buspirone Patent Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that 
BMS was not entitled to Noerr-Pennington immunity against claims arising out of its allegedly 
fraudulent listing of its patents in the Orange Book). 
 132. 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 133. Id. at 233. 
 134. Id. 
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III.  THE SAGA OF GABAPENTIN HYDROCHLORIDE 
The saga of Neurontin® began some time ago.  Before diving into this 
history, it is helpful to review some practices common in the medical and 
pharmaceutical industries that underscore the deficiencies of the Act.  In 
particular, the ability of doctors to prescribe “off-label” use for prescription 
medication is what drives the story behind Neurontin®. 
Under the FDCA,135 new pharmaceutical drugs cannot be distributed in 
interstate commerce unless the manufacturer of the drug demonstrates to the 
FDA that the drug is safe and effective for a particular and intended use.136  
When a drug is approved for a single use, however, the FDA will not prevent a 
doctor from prescribing that drug for uses other than the FDA-approved use.137  
Allowing physicians “to prescribe drugs for such ‘off-label’ usage ‘is an 
accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate 
[pharmaceuticals] without directly interfering with the practice of 
medicine.”138 
The difficulty arises because, although the FDA allows physicians to 
prescribe drugs for off-label uses, it does not allow manufacturers, generic or 
branded, to market or promote drugs for off-label uses.139  The governing 
statute expressly prohibits distribution of a drug for non-approved uses140 and 
distribution of “misbranded” drug.141  A “misbranded” drug is a drug for which 
the manufacturer has included on the label non-FDA-approved uses.  For 
example, if the drug Neurontin® is only approved for the treatment of epilepsy 
(which it was for a long while), the label cannot suggest or instruct that it may 
be used to treat bi-polar disorder.  Simply including information on a drug’s 
label about an “off-label” use will result in “misbranding.”142  A manufacturer 
wishing to promote a drug for an “off label” use must submit materials to the 
FDA where they undergo rigorous review.  If the manufacturer wants the drug 
to be labeled for this new usage, then the manufacturer must submit the safety 
and efficacy tests that were required for the first use.143 
Drug companies may seek wide-spread use of a drug for all purposes, both 
labeled and “off-label.”  A labeled use is valuable because FDA approval 
largely determines whether a prescription for that drug will be reimbursed 
 
 135. See supra note 3, at § 301-397. 
 136. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) & (d) (2000). 
 137. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 44 (D. Mass. 2001) 
(citing Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
 140. Id. 
 141. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). 
 142. See Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 143. See id. at 334 (setting forth the requirements of the Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997, 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa, et seq.). 
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under the federal Medicaid program.144  However, as seen in the case of 
Neurontin®, off-label sales may form the bulk of a drug’s sale. 
A. Background of Neurontin® 
Neurontin® is the brand name for a drug having gabapentin as the active 
ingredient.  The drug was first approved for use in 1993 as an adjunctive 
therapy in the treatment of partial seizures with and without secondary 
generalization in adults with epilepsy in doses from 900 to 1,800 mg per day.  
Since its introduction and first approval, Neurontin® has been prescribed for 
many off-label uses.  The approved usage, however, remained solely for the 
treatment of epilepsy until mid-2002 when the FDA approved Neurontin® for 
postherpetic neuralgia.145  These uses range from pain control, as mono-
therapy for epilepsy, for control of bipolar disorder, and as a treatment for 
attention deficit disorder.  The drug was brought to market by the 
pharmaceutical company Parke-Davis.  Parke-Davis later became the 
pharmaceutical products division of the Warner-Lambert Company.  To 
complete the large-fish-eat-smaller-fish trend, Warner-Lambert, including the 
Parke-Davis division, was acquired by Pfizer, Inc., another pharmaceutical 
manufacturer.  Pfizer, however, has stayed above the fray and has taken the 
position that it is only cleaning up the mess, if any, that its predecessors-in-
interest wrought. 
B. Opinions Involving Neurontin® 
There are now more than twenty reported cases that mention the drug 
Neurontin®.  Not all of these involve Orange Book listings.  Many involve 
long lists of medications that litigants were taking with such causes of action 
sounding in personal injury torts or denial of governmental assistance with the 
purchase of medication.  The remainder of the suits, the focus of this section, 
are exemplary of the problems inherent in the Hatch-Waxman Act.  As an 
overview, it is helpful to know that Neurontin® has received two “30-month 
stays” for a total length of fifty-three months, with the second stay beginning at 
the twenty-third month of the first stay.146  It is important to note is that generic 
manufacturers did not immediately attempt to enter the market, i.e., challenge 
 
 144. Medicaid is, in most circumstances, available only for “covered outpatient drugs.”  42 
U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(10) (2000).  Covered outpatient drugs do not include drugs that are “used for a 
medical indication which is not a medically accepted indication.”  42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(3).  A 
medically accepted indication, in turn, includes a use “which is approved under the Federal Food 
Drug and Cosmetic Act” or which is included in specified drug compendia.  42 U.S.C. § 1396r-
8(k)(6).  See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(i) (identifying compendia to be consulted). 
 145. This particular use is protected by a three-year, non-patent market exclusivity conferred 
by a provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Those provisions are not relevant to this article.  See 
Purepac Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 146. See FTC Study, supra note 63, at 49. 
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the composition and approved use patents, the first listed patents.  It was only 
when a later-issued patent was listed in the Orange Book did litigation ensue. 
In an attempt to make sense of the tangled web Neurontin® has weaved in 
both the courts and the FDA, the cases are discussed below to provide a broad 
picture of the system and its failures, for both branded and generic drug 
manufacturers and the public. 
1. Purepac and Apotex - The Generic’s Perspective 
On January 16, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit held that it is not an act of infringement for a drug manufacturer to 
submit an ANDA for approval to market a drug for a use when neither the drug 
nor that use is covered by an existing patent, and the patent at issue is for a use 
not approved by the FDA under an NDA.147  This is a mouthful, but the upshot 
is that a new drug applicant, having received approval for a particular use of a 
drug, cannot use the rights conferred under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) to subject 
an abbreviated new drug applicant to infringement liability or to extend their 
exclusivity afforded by their patents when the new drug applicant’s listed 
patents claim a use different from the use for which the abbreviated new drug 
applicant seeks approval.  Surprisingly, this simple concept wound up before 
the Federal Circuit. 
In Warner-Lambert Company v. Apotex Corporation,148 the assignee of 
United States Patent 5,084,479 (“the ‘479 patent” or “the neurodegenerative 
patent”),149 entitled “Novel Methods for Treating Neurodegenerative 
Diseases,” the Warner-Lambert Company (“Warner-Lambert”) filed an 
infringement action against Apotex Corporation, Apotex, Inc., and TorPharm, 
Inc. (collectively “Apotex”).  The ‘479 patent claims the use of certain cyclic 
amino acid compounds, as well as the salts and esters derived from them, for 
the treatment of neurodegenerative diseases such as stroke, Alzheimer’s 
disease, Huntington’s disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, and Parkinson’s 
disease.150  One of these cyclic amino acid compounds, 1-aminomethyl-1-
 
 147. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 148. 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 149. The “‘479 patent” is set to expire in January of 2010.  Id. at 1361. 
 150. Claim 1, the only independent claim in the “‘479 patent”, defines the invention as 
follows: 
  1.  A method for treating neurodegenerative diseases which comprises administering 
a therapeutically effective amount of a compound of formula 
H2N—CH2—C—CH2—COOR1 
(CH2) 
wherein R1 is hydrogen or a lower alkyl and n is 4, 5, or 6 or pharmaceutically acceptable 
salt thereof, in unit dosage form, to a mammal in need of said treatment. 
Id. at 1351. 
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cyclohexane acetic acid is commonly known as “gabapentin.”  Gabapentin is 
what this, and the subsequently discussed cases, concern. 
Warner-Lambert is also the assignee of expired U.S. Patent 4,024,175, 
expired U.S Patent 4,087,544, and U.S. Patent 4,894,476.  The ‘175 patent (the 
“product patent”), entitled “Cyclic Amino Acids,” disclosed and claimed the 
actual compounds that are used in the methods claimed in the 
neurodegenerative method patent; claim 2 specifically claimed 1-aminomethyl-
1-cyclohexane acetic acid (i.e., gabapentin).  The ‘544 patent (“the epilepsy 
method”), entitled “Treatments of Cranial Dysfunctions using Novel Cyclic 
Amino Acids,” disclosed and claimed a method of treating certain forms of 
epilepsy, faintness attacks, hypokinesia, and cranial traumas using the cyclic 
amino acid compounds claimed in the product patent and used in the methods 
of the neurodegenerative method patent, again including gabapentin.  The ‘476 
patent (the “monohydrate patent”), entitled “Gabapentin Monohydrate and a 
Process for Producing the Same,” claims a specific crystalline form of 
gabapentin monohydrate. 151  It is the listing of these patents, and in particular 
the ‘479 neurodegenerative patent, in the Orange Book that gives rise to the 
suits discussed herein. 
On April 17, 1998 Apotex filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act seeking approval for a generic formulation to 
treat epilepsy upon the expiration of the epilepsy method patent on January 16, 
2000.  Apotex sought FDA approval to market gabapentin only for the same 
use or “indication” for which it was approved under Warner-Lambert’s NDA, 
i.e., for “adjunctive therapy in the treatment of partial seizures without 
secondary generalization in adults with epilepsy.”  Under the Act, Apotex 
could seek approval only for previously approved uses.152 
With its ANDA, Apotex submitted the required 
bioavailability/bioequivalence test data and a certification under 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (“the paragraph (IV) certification”) declaring that its 
proposed manufacture, use, and sale of gabapentin would not infringe either 
the monohydrate patent or the neurodegenerative method patent.153  Apotex 
stated that its formulation would be anhydrous (i.e., would not contain water), 
and would, “accordingly, be outside the scope of the monohydrate patent.”154  
Importantly, Apotex declared that its “pharmaceutical product’s labeling does 
not include any indication for use in the treatment of either neurodegenerative 
method patent.”155  Apotex argued that because all of the claims of the 
neurodegenerative method patent “are directed to a use of gabapentin in the 
 
 151. Id. at 1352 (recounting the coverage of Warner-Lambert’s related patents). 
 152. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i) (2000). 
 153. Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1352. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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treatment of neurodegenerative diseases,” Apotex’s manufacture, use, or sale 
of its gabapentin products for the treatment of epilepsy would not infringe the 
neurodegenerative method patent.156  It is important to note that the treatment 
of epilepsy is not the treatment of neurodegenerative diseases. 
An ANDA who files a paragraph (IV) certification must, under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(2)(B)(i), include in its application a statement that it will give notice 
of that filing to the owner of the patent to which the certification pertains157 
and to the holder of the approved NDA for that drug.158  Pursuant to this duty, 
Apotex notified Warner-Lambert that it had filed the ANDA and paragraph 
(IV) certification.159  In addition, and as required by statute, Apotex included in 
its notice letter a detailed statement of the factual and legal basis for its opinion 
of non-infringement of the neurodegenerative method patent.160  This letter 
explained that the use for which Apotex sought approval is for the treatment of 
partial seizure and the ‘479 neurodegenerative patent does not claim a method 
of using gabapentin and its derivatives for partial seizure.161  Apotex’s 
argument was simple, because the ‘479 patent claims are directed to “a method 
of using gabapentin and its derivatives in the treatment of neurodegenerative 
disease,” the product marketed by Apotex would “not fall within the scope of 
any of the claims of the . . . ‘479 patent.”162 
In response to Apotex’s ANDA filing, Warner-Lambert filed an 
infringement action on July 14, 1998, alleging that Apotex’s submission of its 
ANDA was an act of infringement of the neurodegenerative method patent 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).163  Despite the fact that the FDA had not 
approved gabapentin for any of the indications claimed in the 
neurodegenerative method patent, and FDA regulations forbid the promotion 
of unapproved uses by NDA or ANDA holders,164 Warner-Lambert argued that 
“patients will use the Apotex Defendants’ gabapentin for all purposes for 
which Neurontin® product has been and customarily is used, and doctors will 
prescribe the Apotex Defendants’ gabapentin product for such uses, including 
the treatment of neurodegenerative diseases.”165 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i)(I) (2000). 
 158. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i)(II) (2000). 
 159. Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1352-53. 
 160. Id. at 1353. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Warner-Lambert also included a claim under the monohydrate patent.  The district court 
granted summary judgment of non-infringement with respect to the patent on March 2, 2001.  
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98 C 4293, Doc. No. 67 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2001).  
Warner-Lambert did not appeal this judgment. 
 164. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4) (1998). 
 165. Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1353. 
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Apotex moved for summary judgment.  Warner-Lambert countered by 
arguing that (1) the FDA does not regulate the uses for which doctors prescribe 
drugs once they are approved, (2) “more than three-quarters of the 
prescriptions written by doctors for Warner-Lambert’s Neurontin® are for 
indications other than epilepsy, including the treatment of neurodegenerative 
diseases,” and (3) “doctors, managed care organizations, and other institutions 
commonly and routinely substitute generic drugs for all indications for which 
the brand name drug is used.”166  Warner-Lambert further argued that Apotex 
knows, and even expects, that its generic gabapentin, if approved by the FDA, 
“will be prescribed by doctors for all the same reasons they prescribe 
Neurontin®,” including “the treatment of . . . neurodegenerative diseases.”167  
The district court denied Apotex’s motion.168  At the close of discovery, 
Apotex again moved for summary judgment.  The district court granted this 
second motion.169  Warner-Lambert appealed this decision. 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit framed the issue as whether it is an act of 
infringement under the applicable statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2),170 “to submit 
an ANDA seeking approval to make, use, or sell a drug for an approved use if 
any other use of the drug is claimed in a patent, or if it is only an act of 
infringement to submit an ANDA seeking approval to make, use, or sell a drug 
if the drug or the use for which FDA approval is sought is claimed in a 
patent.”171  The issue was recognized as one of first impression for the court.172  
The court held that “it is not an act of infringement to submit an ANDA for 
approval to market a drug for a use when neither the drug nor that use is 
covered by an existing patent, and the patent at issue is for a use not approved 
under the NDA.”173 
 
 166. Id. (citing Warner-Lambert’s “Memorandum in Opposition to Aptoex’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment” at 20 (filed December 10, 1998)). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98 C 4293, 1999 WL 259946 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 
8, 1999). 
 169. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98 C 4293, 2001 WL 1104618 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
14, 2001). 
 170. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2000) provides: 
  It shall be an act of infringement to submit – (A) an application under section 505(j) 
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [codified at 21 U.S.C. §355(j); i.e., and 
ANDA] . . . for a drug claimed in a patent, . . . if the purpose of such submission is to 
obtain approval under such Act [i.e., Title 21 of the United States Code] to engage in the 
commercial manufacturer, use, or sale of a drug . . . claimed in a patent or the use of 
which is claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2000). 
 171. Warner-Lambert Co., 316 F.3d at 1354. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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The court accepted Apotex’s argument that because an ANDA may not 
seek approval for an unapproved or off-label use of a drug under 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(2)(A)(i), “it necessarily follows that 35 U.S.C. [§] 271(e)(2)(A) does not 
apply to a use patent claiming only such a use.”174  The court emphasized that 
the infringement mechanisms provided by 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2) may only be 
used against an ANDA when the NDA’s listed patents claim “the use” for 
which the NDA is seeking approval.175  In addition, the court noted that “[t]he 
FDA does not grant across-the-board approval to market a drug.”176  Rather, 
the agency grants approval to make, use, and sell a drug for a specific purpose 
for which that drug has been demonstrated to be safe and efficacious.177 
Warner-Lambert argued that Apotex was required to submit a certification 
under one of the paragraphs of 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)178 with respect to 
the ‘479 neurodegenerative patent because that patent was listed in the Orange 
Book.179  The court noted that such certification need only be made when the 
listed patent “claims a use for such listed drugs for which the applicant is 
seeking approval . . . .”180  Apotex did, in fact, file such certification, labeled as 
a paragraph (IV) certification, stating that it is not applying for approval to 
market the drug for a non-approved use.181  Indeed, Apotex’s action is 
consistent with the statute because an ANDA may not obtain approval to 
market the drug for a non-approved use without filing its own NDA with full 
safety and efficacy data.  The Federal Circuit, however, noted that Apotex’s 
paragraph (IV) certification was essentially a statement of non-applicable use 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii), a “section (viii) statement.”182  This 
is remarkable because Apotex’s competitor, Purepac, did just that and met with 
considerably less success than Apotex.  In fact, Purepac’s decision to make 
such a statement cost it its priority and rights as the first to file an ANDA, 
discussed below.183  Despite the removal of the ‘479 patent from the thicket of 
 
 174. Id. at 1356. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1356. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See supra note 39, at 28,908. 
 179. Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1360. 
 180. Id. at 1360 (emphasis removed) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)). 
 181. Id. at 1352. 
 182. Id. at 1362.  See supra note 65, at § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) for a discussion of a “section (viii) 
statement.” 
 183. The Federal Circuit also held that Apotex would not induce infringement of the ‘479 
patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1363.  Warner-Lambert argued 
that because by 1998 only 22% of the Neurontin® prescriptions were for the treatment of 
epilepsy, the remaining 78% were being prescribed for off-label uses, including the infringing use 
of treating neurodegenerative diseases.  Id.  Warner-Lambert added that by 1999, the percentage 
of uses other than to treat epilepsy had risen to 89%.  Id.  Additionally, Warner-Lambert argued 
that: 
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potential protection, Pfizer stated that the introduction of generic gabapentin 
would not change.184 
About a month before Federal Circuit rendered its decision in Warner-
Lambert, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., the United States District Court, District of 
Columbia, dealt a fatal blow to the ANDA of Apotex’s competitor, Purepac 
Pharmaceutical (“Purepac”), and its effort to obtain FDA approval to market 
gabapentin.  In Purepac Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Thompson,185 the Court 
rebuffed Purepac’s motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to require the 
FDA to accept, and thus approve, Purepac’s ANDA seeking to market a 
generic version of gabapentin “for the treatment of epilepsy.”186  Purepac also 
 
(1) it is common knowledge to many in and out of the pharmaceutical field that 
physicians routinely prescribe approved drugs for purposes other than those listed on the 
drugs’ labels; indeed, such off-label use is supported by both the FDA and the American 
Medical Association, (2) information regarding both on- and off-label prescriptions is 
readily available to the public from publications and databases to which most 
pharmaceutical companies subscribe, (3) “pharmacists and other drug dispensing 
organizations . . . commonly substitute generic drugs for name brand drugs wherever 
possible – unless specifically instructed otherwise by the physician writing the 
prescription,” and, “in many states, substitution is mandatory,” and (4) Apotex expects to 
get an “A-B rating” for its gabapentin, which would allow physicians and pharmacists to 
substitute generic gabapentin for Neurontin® regardless of the indication for which it is to 
be used, and (5) Apotex should be assumed to have considered the market size and growth 
potential of gabapentin when it made the strategic decision to file an ANDA and enter the 
gabapentin market. 
  See id. at 1364.  Essentially, Warner-Lambert is arguing that Apotex is going for the 
“off-label” market and not the epilepsy treatment market.  Id.  The Court rejected Warner-
Lambert’s arguments, reasoning that even if Apotex knew that doctors could prescribe gabapentin 
for possibly infringing uses, the “mere knowledge of possible infringement by others does not 
amount to inducement; specific intent and action to induce infringement must be proven.”  
Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1364 (citing Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 
544, 554 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).  Apparently Warner-Lambert did not present the requisite evidence.  
Id. 
 184. Pfizer’s January 16, 2003 press release, released the same day as the Federal Circuit’s 
opinion, stated that: 
  Today’s Appellate Court decision concerning the Neurontin ‘479 neurodegenerative 
disease patent has no bearing on the likelihood or timing for the entry of generic 
gabapentin.  Pfizer continues to believe that the likelihood and timing of generic entry 
will depend on FDA decisions regarding approval of generic applications and ultimately 
on the outcome of the litigation relating to its ‘482 patent.  Today’s court decision does 
not affect the status of the litigation on the ‘482 patent. 
Press Release Pfizer (Jan. 16, 2003), available at http://www.pfizer.com/are/news_releases/ 
mn_2003_0116.html.  Warner-Lambert is currently defending an infringement action related to 
the claims of the ‘482 patent.  See supra note 136, at § 355(d). 
 185. Purepac Pharm., Co. v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 186. Id. at 195. 
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sought, unsuccessfully, to prevent the ANDA’s of its competitors, including 
Apotex, from being approved by the FDA.187 
In Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. v. Thompson, Purepac, a generic drug 
manufacturer, sought FDA approval to sell gabapentin only for the treatment 
of epilepsy, and no other use.188  This is consistent with the regulations and 
statutes because, as discussed above, an ANDA can only seek approval for a 
use already approved under a NDA. 
Purepac, in preparing its ANDA, reviewed the same Orange Book-listed 
patents as those Apotex reviewed.  Purepac, however, decided to submit only a 
section (viii) statement with respect to the ‘479 patent, as opposed to the 
strategy adopted by Apotex, which submitted both a section (viii) statement 
and a paragraph (IV) certification.189  The paragraph (IV) statement submitted 
by Apotex, according to the Federal Circuit, “although formally labeled as a 
‘paragraph IV certification,’ . . . with respect to the neurodegenerative method 
patent [it] was effectively a statement of non-applicable use pursuant to 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).”190  Thus, faced with a use patent that claims a 
non-approved use, one generic filed a paragraph (IV) statement (which the 
Federal Court said was technically a section (viii) statement) while another 
filed a section (viii) statement.  The District Court for the District of Columbia, 
of course not having the Federal Circuit’s opinion before it, was asked to 
enjoin the FDA from approving Apotex’s ANDA and to determine whether the 
FDA’s denial of Purepac’s ANDA, containing only a section (viii) statement, 
violated the Administrative Procedure Act.191  Purepac was ultimately denied 
relief by the court. 
This all began in March 1998 when Purepac filed an ANDA with the FDA 
seeking approval to market generic versions of gabapentin tablets and capsules 
for the treatment of epilepsy.192  With its ANDA, Purepac submitted patent 
declarations with respect to the patents listed by Warner-Lambert.193  Purepac 
submitted a paragraph (III) certification with respect to the ‘544 epilepsy 
method patent as it was set to expire on July 16, 2000.194  Purepac submitted 
paragraph (IV) certifications for the ‘476 monohydrate and the ‘482 patents.195  
In contrast to these statements, and pertinent to this review, Purepac submitted 
a section (viii) statement with respect to the ‘479 neurodegenerative disease 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1360; Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 200 n.13. 
 190. Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1360. 
 191. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). 
 192. Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 198. 
 193. Id. at 199. 
 194. When the ‘544 patent expired, it was removed from the Orange Book.  See id. at 198 n.9. 
 195. U.S. Pat. No. 6,054,482 (issued Apr. 25, 2000).  The claims are not relevant to Purepac’s 
ANDA.  Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 197 n.7. 
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patent.  Purepac defended its submission of a section (viii) statement with 
respect to the ‘479 by asserting that, based on Warner-Lambert’s submissions 
to the FDA196 and the FDA’s use code assigned to the ‘479 patent,197 the ‘479 
patent claimed the use of gabapentin to treat neurodegenerative diseases.  
Because its ANDA was seeking approval to market gabapentin to treat 
epilepsy, Purepac “concluded that a section (viii) statement was 
appropriate.”198 
Purepac defended its use of a section (viii) statement in a March 5, 1999 
letter to the FDA.199  In this letter, Purepac argues that a section (viii) 
statement is proper, and that a paragraph (IV) certification is improper, because 
“the ‘479 patent is a method of use patent covering an indication which is not 
present in the innovator’s [Warner-Lambert’s] approved labeling.”200  The 
FDA responded by stating that it was not the agency’s duty to correct 
information in Orange Book listings and informed Purepac of its right to use 
21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) to challenge Warner-Lambert’s submission of the ‘479 
patent for inclusion in the Orange Book.201  Interestingly, the FDA’s letter 
indicated that it had contacted Warner-Lambert’s patent attorney, who, 
incidentally, verified the propriety of the ‘479 patent’s listing in the Orange 
Book.  Based on this, the FDA concluded that it could not confirm that the use 
of a section (viii) statement was proper.  To recapitulate, although Warner-
Lambert had affirmatively stated that the ‘479 patent only claims the use of 
Neurontin® to treat neurodegenerative disease, coupled with the fact that the 
FDA gave the ‘479 patent a use code different from the approved use, the FDA 
still would accept Purepac’s section (viii) statement simply because Warner-
 
 196. During the NDA process, Warner-Lambert declared at least twice that the ‘479 patent 
claims a method for treating neurodegenerative diseases. Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1352.  In 
other statements, Warner-Lambert declared that “the ‘479 patent, the ‘544 patent, and the ‘476 
patent together ‘cover the composition, formulation and/or method use of Neurontin®.”’  
Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 198.  Warner-Lambert did not, however, specify if they were 
asserting any particular use.  Id. at 198 n.10. 
 197. When patents are submitted to the FDA for Orange Book listing the FDA assigns “use 
codes” to the patents.  Id. at 198.  The codes “allow interested parties, including ANDA 
applicants, to determine the particular medical uses of brand-name drugs asserted by the various 
use patents listed in the Orange Book.”  Id.  See also Abbreviated New Drug Application 
Regulations; Patent & Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg., supra note 33, at 50,346 (“In 
addition for a use patent, FDA includes in the Orange Book a code identifying the indication 
covered by the patent.”). 
 198. Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 199. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id.  21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) is discussed in Section IV, infra.  Purepac, at oral argument, 
stated that it chose not to invoke 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) because it had no dispute over Warner-
Lambert’s listing of the patent since neither company treated the ‘470 patent as claming the use of 
treating epilepsy.  Id.  In hindsight, it is apparent that Purepac should have attempted to invoke 
this regulatory measure.  Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 199. 
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Lambert maintained its listing in the Orange Book.  Essentially, through 
additional letters to Purepac, the FDA took the position that if a party lists a 
patent in the Orange Book and there is only one approved use, any use patents 
listed must somehow claim that use (otherwise that party would be improperly 
listing a patent). 
Ultimately, the FDA resolved that if Purepac wanted its ANDA approved, 
it had to submit a paragraph (IV) certification, and thus, expose itself to 
infringement liability and suffer the consequences of a 30-month stay.202  
Purepac knew that Warner-Lambert would not hesitate to bring suit under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e) as Warner-Lambert had already brought suit against Purepac 
and Apotex for paragraph (IV) statements regarding patents other than the ‘479 
patent, the Orange Book listing of which is not questioned.  Thus, the FDA 
refused to approve Purepac’s ANDA without a paragraph (IV) statement 
regarding the ‘479 patent.203 
Meanwhile, Purepac’s competitor, Apotex, had submitted an ANDA 
containing both a paragraph (IV) and a section (viii) statement with respect to 
the ‘479 patent.  Although Apotex was the second company to file an ANDA 
seeking to market gabapentin,204 it was the first to file an ANDA containing a 
paragraph (IV) certification with respect to the ‘479 patent (making it eligible 
for the 180-day market exclusivity period and making it liable for an 
infringement action).  As discussed above, Warner-Lambert did bring suit 
against Apotex.  The Federal Circuit ultimately held that Apotex’s paragraph 
(IV) certification was, in essence, the same as a section (viii) statement, and 
that Warner-Lambert did not have a cause of action against Apotex under 35 
U.S.C. 271(e)(2).205 
In related litigation, Warner-Lambert had already brought suit against 
Purepac in two separate actions in New Jersey.  Inexplicably, one action was 
based on Purepac’s section (viii) statement with respect to the ‘479 patent 
(recall, a section (viii) statement does not give rise to a cause of action, a 
paragraph (IV) certification is a condition precedent to any such suit).  The 
other action was based on the ‘476 patent, for which Purepac had filed a 
paragraph (IV) certification.  In addition, Warner-Lambert brought an 
infringement action against Purepac for its paragraph (IV) certification with 
respect to the ‘482 patent as well.  In light of this litigation, it is reasonable for 
Purepac to want to avoid additional litigation by simply supplying a section 
(viii) statement with its ANDA with respect to the ‘479 patent. 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Apotex’s application was filed April 17, 1998.  Id. at 200.  Purepac’s application, 
containing the section (viii) statement was filed March 1998.  Id. at 198. 
 205. Warner-Lambert also brought a Section 271(e)(2) infringement action against Apotex for 
its filing of an ANDA containing a paragraph (IV) certification with respect to the ‘482 patent.  
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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Purepac, faced with the FDA approving Apotex’s ANDA after the stay 
was lifted in that action, brought suit against the FDA seeking to enjoin it from 
acting on Apotex’s application and seeking an order directing the FDA to 
approve its application.206  The court ultimately refused to enjoin the FDA 
from acting on Apotex’s application.207  With the resolution of Warner-
Lambert’s suit against Apotex, as resolved by the Federal Circuit, the FDA 
will likely approve Apotex’s ANDA for gabapentin unless Warner-Lambert 
successfully appeals to the United States Supreme Court.  Thus, Purepac’s 
decision to submit a section (viii) statement, instead of a paragraph (IV) 
certification, will likely result in the approval of its competitor’s ANDA before 
its own, resulting in loss of the 180-day market exclusivity period.  This is 
Purepac’s lot, despite the Federal Circuit, one month later, holding that the 
Apotex’s paragraph (IV) certification was essentially a section (viii) statement 
and that Warner-Lambert did not have a cause of action against an ANDA 
submitting a section (viii) statement with respect to the ‘479 patent. 
For the sake of resolution, it should be noted that the district court deciding 
Purepac’s fate held that the FDA had no rational basis for denying Purepac’s 
ANDA for gabapentin because of their inclusion of the section (viii) 
statement.208  The court stated that the FDA’s position that the ‘479 patent 
claims the use of treating epilepsy, simply because it is listed in the Orange 
Book for a drug that had only one approved use (treating epilepsy) could not 
stand.209  The FDA, throughout the controversy, insisted that the issue 
concerned the ‘479 patent claims, and that it was not equipped to make such 
determinations.210  The FDA, in fact, has specifically disclaimed any role in 
determining what uses a particular patent claims.211 
The agency’s “self-abnegation” creates a possible conflict between NDA 
holders and ANDA applicants over the proper scope of a use patent.  
Essentially the facts would be similar to that surrounding Purepac’s ANDA for 
gabapentin.  The NDA would list various patents in the Orange Book, 
including composition, formulation, and use patents.  The use patents listed 
would include both approved and non-approved uses.  If there was only one 
approved use, the FDA (or some other arbitrator, e.g., the courts) would then 
 
 206. Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 201. 
 207. Id. at 211. 
 208. Id. at 204. 
 209. Id. at 205. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Purepac, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 204.  See also Abbreviated New Drug Application 
Regulations; Patent & Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg., supra note 33, at 50,345 (the “FDA 
does not have the resources to review patent information for its accuracy and relevance to an 
NDA.”); Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. supra note 33, at 28,909 
(“Because the FDA has no experience in the field of patents, the agency has no basis for 
determining whether a use patent covers the use sought by the generic applicant.”). 
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have to determine whether the listed use patents claimed the approved use.  
The FDA has long taken the position that it does not want this job.212  The 
courts have upheld the FDA as taking a “purely ministerial” role.213  The 
resulting situation, however, is that a generic manufacturer, making an 
absolutely proper section (viii) statement, can lose its priority to a subsequent 
ANDA by the competitor taking the risk to file the first paragraph (IV) 
certification. 
2. Neurontin® in Other Cases 
There are a total of twenty-five published cases mentioning Neurontin®.  
Six of these involve Warner-Lambert’s Orange Book listings.  There are the 
suits brought against Apotex and Purepac, the district court decisions and the 
Federal Circuit decision.  The majority of these cases, sixteen, are cases 
involving individuals bringing suit for various causes of action against the 
Commissioner of Social Security and other government agency heads in order 
to receive Neurontin® as a prescription drug.  These cases do not involve the 
Orange Book listings.  Two other cases are worth mentioning, as is a recently 
coordinated multidistrict litigation antitrust action. 
In the antitrust litigation,214 seventeen antitrust actions pending in six 
districts were transferred to a single district in the District of New Jersey.215  
All of the actions are purported class actions alleging that Warner-Lambert 
Co., and its parent, Pfizer, Inc., violated antitrust laws and excluded generic 
competition for gabapentin by “bringing sham patent infringement actions 
against a number of generic drug manufacturers.”216  A number of the 
underlying plaintiffs are organizations that pay for prescription drugs.217  As 
the antitrust suit continues to play out, it will, undoubtedly, look to the various 
decisions involving Orange Book listings by Warner-Lambert.  The use of 
antitrust law is certainly one way that potential inequitable results brought 
about by improper Orange Book listings could be remedied.  It is, however, 
 
 212. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent & Exclusivity Provisions, 59 
Fed. Reg., supra note 33, at 50,348 (October 3, 1994). 
 213. See aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 243 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding the 
FDA’s “purely ministerial approach to the Orange Book listing process.”). 
 214. See In re Neurontin Antitrust Litig., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1380 (Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation) for the latest order consolidating seventeen antitrust actions pending in 
six districts. 
 215. The case consolidated seven actions in the Southern District of New York, five actions in 
the District of New Jersey, two actions in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and one each in 
the Northern District of California, the Eastern District of Michigan, and the Eastern District of 
New York.  Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Some of the plaintiffs include: Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company, Inc., Health & 
Benefit Trust Fund of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local Union 94, and 
Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia.  Id. at 1381-82. 
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only partially satisfactory because it would still allow a company to list the 
patents in the first place, thus causing unneeded patent litigation. 
The remaining two cases involve a former Parke-Davis employee who 
brought a qui tam action against his former employer.  In United States ex rel. 
Franklin v. Parke-Davis218 the qui tam relator brought an action under the 
False Claims Act (“FCA”)219 against Parke-Davis alleging, inter alia, that 
Parke-Davis engaged in a fraudulent scheme to promote sale of drugs for “off-
label” uses and that the illegal marketing campaign caused the submission of 
false claims to the Veteran’s Administration and to the federal government for 
Medicaid reimbursement.220  This case is still pending, but from it, two 
published opinions have issued.221 
In these two opinions, the relator, Dr. David Franklin, alleges that Parke-
Davis engaged in a fraudulent scheme to promote the sale of Neurontin® for 
“off-label” uses.  Dr. Franklin222 conveys the tale as a Parke-Davis employee 
over the entire five months he worked as a “medical liaison” in 1996.223  Dr. 
Franklin alleges that despite Neurontin® being solely approved for the 
treatment of epilepsy in doses from 900 to 1,800 mg per day, Parke-Davis 
instructed its medical liaisons to make exaggerated or false-claims concerning 
the safety and efficacy of Neurontin® for “off-label” uses.224  The liaisons, 
allegedly, were instructed to convey that Neurontin® could be prescribed for 
various off-label uses in amounts up to 4,800 mg per day.225  Parke-Davis also 
allegedly instructed doctors on how to receive government reimbursement for 
prescriptions written for off-label uses and gave illegal “kickbacks” to doctors 
in forms varying from sums of money for “drug studies” and for their services 
as “consultants” or “preceptors.”226  Dr. Franklin’s nine-count qui tam action 
remained filed under seal for almost five years before the United States finally 
decided to participate, but only in the capacity of amicus curiae.227  At this 
point in the litigation, the claims regarding Neurontin® survived motions to 
dismiss for failure to plead the fraud aspects with the requisite particularity.228 
 
 218. There are two reported decisions in this case, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 2001); and 
210 F.R.D. 257 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 219. 31 U.S.C. § 3729-33 (2000). 
 220. United States ex rel Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 43 (D. Mass. 2001). 
 221. See id. 
 222. Dr. Franklin holds a doctorate degree in biology, has co-authored five scientific 
publications, is listed as the inventor on a patent application (pending as of 2001), and received a 
two-year research fellowship with Harvard Medical School and the Dana Farber Cancer Institute 
in Boston in 1992.  Id. at 44. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 45. 
 225. Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 45. 
 226. Id. at 46. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 49. 
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The other reported decision involves the New York Times Company, 
publisher of the New York Times and the Boston Globe, and the National 
Broadcasting Company, Inc.’s successful bid to intervene in order to modify a 
protective order.229  These media entities were successful in altering a 
protective order as overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment.230  The 
cases make for good reading but stray from the topic of the listing of patents in 
the Orange Book.  It is worth noting, however, that the off-label use of 
Neurontin® has, unfortunately, been implicated with at least one death, a 
suicide, when the drug was prescribed for the treatment of bipolar disorder.231  
When rethinking the law, Congress may want to provide further guidance for 
the FDA’s policy of allowing seemingly unlimited off-label uses for drugs.  
Turning from this digression back to Orange Book cases, it is worth reviewing 
how other Orange Book listing cases have been handled by the courts. 
IV.  RELIEF FOR AGGRIEVED PARTIES 
The above review of recent cases might lead one to believe that there are 
no remedies available to a party who believes that a patent is improperly listed 
in the Orange Book.  It is almost that bad.  One court has recognized that “[i]n 
short, [the] FDA’s position is that if the NDA holder stands on its Orange 
Book listing, aggrieved parties are out of luck.”232  Essentially, the FDA has 
concluded that disputes about the propriety of Orange Book listings and the 
scope of listed patents are best resolved in private litigation, not by or through 
the agency.233 There is, however, one regulatory tool at the aggrieved parties 
disposal, that being 21 C.F.R. 314.53(f). 
Food and Drug Administration regulations do provide for correction of 
“patent errors.”234  This mechanism, however, is of little use.  Under the 
regulation, “any person” that disputes the accuracy of an Orange Book listing, 
or if the failure to list a patent is questioned, that party may notify the FDA of 
such disputed listing in writing.235  The FDA, in turn: 
[W]ill then request of the applicable new drug application holder that the 
correctness of the patent information or omission of patent information be 
 
 229. 210 F.R.D. at 257. 
 230. The government opposed modifying the protective order, arguing that modification that 
would allow media access “would interfere with ongoing investigations.”  Id. at 258 n.3.  The 
court, however, noted that the “action was filed in 1996 and the government [still has] not 
decided whether to intervene.  Molasses moves more quickly.”  Id. 
 231. As reported by National Public Radio’s Snigdha Prakash, All Things Considered, 
January 16, 2003, available at http://www.npr.org. 
 232. aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 233. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent Exclusivity Provisions, 
supra note 33, at 50, 348. 
 234. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) (1998). 
 235. Id. 
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confirmed.  Unless the application holder withdraws or amends its patent 
information in response to FDA’s request, the agency will not change the 
patent information in the list.  If the new drug application holder does not 
change the patent information submitted to FDA, . . . despite any disagreement 
as to the correctness of the patent information, contain an appropriate 
certification for each listed patent.236 
This provision has no teeth in it whatsoever.  Basically, the NDA simply has to 
verify its listings, an entirely self-serving opportunity with no agency 
interaction.  An ANDA is better off not even asking for the FDA to seek 
confirmation from the NDA.  The ANDA would simply give the NDA more 
advance notice than in its paragraph (IV) certification.  This area is ripe for the 
FDA to promulgate new regulations.  This lack of regulation is, however, 
consistent with the FDA’s position that it will maintain a purely ministerial 
role in the Orange Book listings. 
To further frustrate the plight of the ANDA, it has been held that a generic 
drug manufacturer has no cause of action under either the Hatch-Waxman Act 
or the patent laws to obtain declaratory or injunctive relief requiring an NDA 
holder to “delist” a patent improperly listed in the Orange Book.237  The 
Federal Circuit, however, has suggested that a cause of action lies under the 
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”).238  In Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Biovail Corporation the Federal Circuit suggests that a generic manufacturer 
could bring an APA challenge against the FDA based on the agency’s failure 
to inquire into the correctness of an Orange Book listing. 239  The Fourth 
Circuit decision in aaiPharma, however, seems to wholly oppose this possible 
cause of action.  In aaiPharma, the Fourth Circuit endorsed the FDA’s position 
that its role in Orange Book listings is purely ministerial.240  The aaiPharma 
decision essentially insulates and shields the FDA from an APA lawsuit based 
on improper Orange Book listings. 
The Purepac case, however, apparently recognizes one cause of action that 
still might exist under the APA.  Namely, that an ANDA could argue that a 
section (viii) statement is proper and the FDA’s rejection of such statement is 
arbitrary and capricious.  Recall, however, that in Purepac, the ANDA holder 
was not successful in preventing the FDA from allowing its competitor’s 
 
 236. Id. 
 237. See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002); cf. Andrx 
Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming Mylan, but 
suggesting that a generic manufacturer could bring an APA challenge against the FDA based on 
the agency’s failure to inquire into the correctness of an Orange Book listing).  The Federal 
Circuit’s suggestion, however, has apparently been quashed by the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
aaiPharma.  See supra note 108, effectively closing the door on an APA challenge. 
 238. Andrx, 276 F.3d at 1374. 
 239. Id. 
 240. aaiPharma v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002). 
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ANDA for the same generic drug.  Thus, there clearly is tension between the 
Fourth Circuit decision and the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of how the 
APA can be used by aggrieved ANDA applicants. 
V.  STATUTORY IMPROVEMENTS 
Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always remain 
unaltered. 
-Aristotle241 
With the bench unequivocally holding that there is not a clearly 
recognizable cause of action against an NDA who improperly lists a patent or 
patents in the Orange Book, there appears to be little relief for those unjustly 
stifled in their efforts to bring a generic to market.  There are, however, 
legislative changes in the works. 
As of this writing, a bill has been introduced in Congress that would 
amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with the stated intent of 
providing greater access to affordable pharmaceuticals.  The bill, entitled the 
“Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2003,” was introduced 
January 7, 2003 by Senator Susan Collins.242  In introducing the bill, Senator 
Collins remarked that the bipartisan bill will make prescription drugs more 
affordable and promote competition in the pharmaceutical industry.  Senator 
Collins noted that “[p]rescription drug spending in the United States has 
increased by 92 percent over the past 5 years to almost $120 million.”243  The 
Congressional Budget Office estimates that, if enacted, the amendments would 
cut our Nation’s drug costs by $60 billion over the next 10 years.244  Senator 
Collins noted that the bill is supported by coalitions representing the 
governors, insurers, businesses, organized labor, senior groups, and individual 
consumers who foot the bill for expensive drugs.245 
Senator Collins again, in her introductory remarks, recognized that the 
Hatch-Waxman Act now allows generics to enter the market immediately upon 
expiration of “the patent” as compared to the three to five years before the 
enactment of the Act.  She notes, however, that “[i]f Hatch-Waxman were to 
work as it was intended, consumers could expect to save between fifty and 
 
 241. BARNES & NOBLE BOOKS , THE LAWYER’S QUOTATION BOOK: A LEGAL COMPANION 
(John Reay-Smith ed., 1992). 
 242. New Bill (S. 54) to Improve Access to Generic Drugs, Cong. Rec., S54, S54-59 (January 
7, 2003), reprinted in 65 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 260 (January 17, 2003) 
(hereinafter “Senator Collins”).  Senator Collins (R) is senator for the state of Maine. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Not to make light of the situation, but the Patent Bar is conspicuously absent from her 
list.  To date and to the author’s knowledge, the American Bar Association’s Section of 
Intellectual Property has not taken a position on the proposed legislation. 
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sixty percent on . . . drugs as lower cost generic alternatives become available 
as . . . patents expire.”246 
Senator Collins further recognized that “[d]espite its past success, 
however, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Hatch-Waxman Act has 
been subject to abuse.247  While many pharmaceutical companies have acted in 
good faith, there is mounting evidence that some brand name generic drug 
manufacturers have attempted to ‘game’ the system by exploiting legal 
loopholes in the current law.248  Senator Collins alleges that brand-name 
companies can delay a generic drug from going to market for years.249  A 
‘new’ patent for an existing drug can be awarded for merely changing the color 
of a pill or its packaging.250  For example, BMS delayed generic competition 
on Platinol, a cancer treatment, by filing a patent on the brown bottle it came 
in.251  Obviously these remarks were made on the floor of the Senate and not 
by the Commissioner of Patents.  Senator Collins’ remarks were, admittedly, 
based on the testimony of the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, 
Timothy Muris, made before the Senate Commerce Commission.252  Drug 
companies cannot get a continuation patent by simply “changing the color of a 
pill” or claiming a “brown bottle.”  This simply is not the patent law.  Senator 
Collins’ remarks, however, do appear targeted at certain formulation and 
packaging patents that can, because of the specific scope of their claims, 
potentially exclude generic drug manufacturers from entering the market.  The 
patents, however, may also spur innovation.  Additionally, Senator Collins 
references the antitrust violations associated with drugs such as Cardizem 
CD®.  The producer of Cardizem CD® brought patent and trademark 
infringement actions against a generic manufacturer.  The manufacturer 
offered a settlement to pay the generic company more than $80 million in 
return for keeping the generic drug off the market.  Such actions, according to 
Senator Collins, caused users of Cardizem CD® , which treats high blood 
pressure, chest pains and heart disease, to pay $73 a month when the generic 
would have cost about $32 a month.  The remarks rely heavily on the FTC’s 
report on the loopholes of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  The proposed amendments 
are fashioned to close these loopholes. 
The proposed amendments appear to make major changes to the Orange 
Book listing practice.253  For one, an NDA holder would be required to list, 
 
 246. See Senator Collins, supra note 242, at S58. 
 247. Id. at S54-9. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See Senator Collins, supra note 242, at S54-9. 
 252. Id. 
 253. The major amendments occur in 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2), (c)(3), and (j)(5).  The 
amendments to subsection (j)(5) exclude patents that claim a process for manufacturing listed 
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inter alia, the patent number, the expiration date of the patent, with respect to 
each claim, if the patent claims a method use, the approved use covered by the 
claim, and a declaration that the applicant, as of the date of the filing, has 
provided complete and accurate patent information for all patents listed.  The 
introduction of these provisions forces the NDA holder to make clear how a 
listed patent relates to the drug at issue and its approved uses.  Conversely, an 
ANDA applicant would have to file either a section (vii) paragraph (IV) 
statement or a section (viii) statement with respect to each claim of a listed 
patent.  This would appear to close the loophole that created the Apotex and 
Purepac dilemmas.  In addition, it would appear to create criminal liability 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for making false declarations as well. 
In addition, and most importantly, the proposed legislation creates a 
private right of action to challenge Orange Book patent listings.  The provision 
allows an ANDA applicant to file a civil action that corrects the patent 
information submitted by an NDA holder by way of deleting certain patents or 
seeking a declaration that the patent does not claim the approved drug or that 
the patent does claim an approved use of the drug.  The section does, however, 
specifically preclude an award of damages.254 
Other remarkable amendments include: (1) a provision that apparently bars 
a patent holder from ever bringing suit against an ANDA holder if suit is not 
brought within 45 days of the NDA receiving notice of the ANDA’s paragraph 
(IV) certification, (2) a provision that limits the 180-day exclusivity period 
awarded to first-filed ANDAs to those situations where the applicant has not 
committed a “forfeiture event,”255 (3) the 180-day exclusivity period will not 
be awarded if the ANDA holder is implicated in a civil suit brought against the 
ANDA for patent infringement, and (4) the NDA holders are entitled to more 
detailed notices from ANDAs, such as “a description of the [ANDA’s] 
proposed drug substance, drug formulation, drug composition, or method of 
use.”256  The bill also allocates five million dollars for implementing them and 
carrying out the amendments.257 
 
drug and patents that issue after the NDA is approved from the 30-month stay.  21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(5).  In addition, it is the author’s interpretation that an NDA holder listing a patent issued 
after the NDA is approved would be required to bring a suit, accompanied by a motion for 
preliminary injunction, in order to invoke the 30-month stay. 
 254. See Senator Collins, supra note 242, at S55. 
 255. The forfeiture events include: (a) failure to market the generic drug, (b) withdrawal of an 
application, (c) the applicant amends their certification made with respect to the Orange Book 
patents, (d) failure of obtain approval of the application, (e) failure to challenge new patent 
information submitted by the NDA holder, and (f) engaging in unlawful conduct.  See Senator 
Collins, supra note 242, at S57.  This last provision, regarding unlawful conduct, is most likely 
directed to settlement agreements between ANDA’s and NDA’s wherein the ANDA agrees to 
refrain from entering a market to which they have a right to enter in exchange for a payment.  Id. 
 256. See Senator Collins, supra note 242, at S57. 
 257. Id. at S57. 
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Interestingly, the proposed legislation does not include two of the 
recommendations proposed in the FTC Study from 2002.  In particular, any 
limitation on the number of 30-month stays is conspicuously absent.  This 
absence is likely because the NDA should be entitled to an additional 30-
month stay if a later-issued patent becomes a later-listed patent.  If only one 
30-month stay were allowed, an ANDA could receive FDA approval before 
the conclusion of an infringement suit and the ANDA could, to the degree it 
felt comfortable, begin marketing the generic drug while risking defeat in the 
infringement action.  Any limitations on the type of patents, i.e., metabolite, 
product by process patents, that can be listed in the Orange Book are not 
incorporated into the proposed bill as well. 
The proposed legislation appears to fill many of the “loopholes” found in 
the current law.  The impact such legislation may have on the pharmaceutical 
industry and the intellectual property law community in general is yet to be 
seen.  It is likely that Congress will pass some bill that addresses prescription 
drug costs in light of budget constraints in government support of healthcare.  
Such legislation, when ultimately enacted, will certainly spawn additional 
litigation.  The issues, however, should be much narrower than found in the 
cases discussed herein. 
So is the Hatch-Waxman Act, as it stands today, a good law?  It has 
definitely done much to protect the rights of innovators and to move generic 
prescription drugs to market.  Before its enactment, patentees were able to 
extend their monopolies past the legal expiration dates of their patents.  The 
Act balanced the playing field between the generic drug manufacturers and the 
branded manufacturers.  In the future, hopefully a new balance will be struck; a 
balance that clearly defines the rights of both the patentees and the generic 
drug manufacturers.  Only at that point will the original intention of the Hatch-
Waxman Act be realized. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The Hatch-Waxman Act was passed to strike a balance between competing 
interests, the rights of pioneer drug manufacturers and the consuming public.  
The provisions therein have done much to meet these difficult-to-reach goals.  
There are, however, two major hurdles to fully reaching the Act’s goals: (1) 
improper Orange Book listings, and (2) the unrestricted practice of allowing 
prescription drugs to be prescribed for “off-label” uses.  The practice that has 
developed with respect to Orange Book listings has created opportunities for 
NDA holders, be they generic or branded drug manufacturers, to potentially 
improperly expand the scope of their patents.  The courts have now ruled on 
the relevant statutory language, holding that there is not a cause of action for a 
party aggrieved by an Orange Book listing.  In order to fully realize the intent 
of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress must amend the laws as they exist today 
to provide, inter alia, a private right of action for aggrieved parties. 
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